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Ethnic Identity and the 2008 Beijing Olympics 
 
By James Leibold 
With the self-professed slogans of the Green Olympics, High-tech Olympics and the People’s Olympics, 
the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG) should have anticipated criticism. 
It left nothing to chance in hosting the world’s athletes and spectators—gleaming stadia, smiling faces 
and blue skies: all as ordered. But as many Western observers noted, BOCOG forgot to invite the 
Chinese people—with security guards, CCTV cameras and robot-like volunteers ensuring little 
spontaneity or popular emotion at the so-called People’s Games. 
In the wake of the unprecedented media coverage of China’s global “coming out party,” few have 
paused to consider who and what were on display at Beijing 2008. In the pomp and pageantry of the 
most expensive Olympic Games in history, whose image did the organizers project before the world’s 
probing gaze? In promoting the Olympic Games and Olympic Movement, BOCOG promised to 
“organize diversified cultural and educational programs to cater to the needs of the people,” while 
encouraging “the widest participation of the people in the preparation of the Games” in order to 
“increase the cohesion and pride of the Chinese nation.” But a closer look at the preparations and 
staging of the Games reveals deep strains in the very fabric of the Chinese nation, not only the fraying 
threads of class, place, and gender, which have been often commented on, but also of ethnicity. 
It has become commonplace in academic literature to speak about the “inchoate,” “incoherent,” and 
“amorphous” nature of Chinese nationalism, what John Fitzgerald termed a “nationless state,” a 
fractured and divided people forcefully held together by an autocratic state structure. Unlike Europe, 
state and nation building in modern China occurred alongside one another, with an increasingly 
powerful state elite experimenting with different formulae for the nation: who was to be included, in 
what proportions, and under what terms. Here the ethnic composition of the nation-state proved 
particularly problematic. China is home to both a single, dominant Han majority—whose over one 
billion people are beset by numerous linguistic, cultural, class, and place divisions—and scores of small 
and highly scattered minorities living along the state’s massive frontier regions. 
In the making/baking of the nation-cake, we can identify at least three distinct, yet overlapping, 
recipes in the Chinese cupboard over the last century or so. What I will term: 1) Leninist-style 
multiculturalism; 2) Han racism; and 3) Confucian ecumenism. It is important to note that each of 
these recipes explicitly excludes the possibility of ethnic separatism and transnational ties. The nature 
and size of the baker’s bowl was never really in question; rather the modern Chinese state and its 
elites inherited the Qing geobody and set about constructing the nation from within its boundaries. Yet 
while the contours of the nation-cake were largely fixed, its ingredients were open for debate. In what 
follows, I seek to tease out some of these unresolved tensions, and explore how they were reflected 
on the stage and behind the scenes of China’s Olympic moment. 
Leninist-style multiculturalism 
As a Leninist party-state, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) sought initially to solve the “national 
question” in accordance with the “scientific laws” of historical materialism. Material progress was 
viewed as a linear path; but not all peoples were thought to progress at the same rate, leaving the 
problem of “backward and feudal national minorities” for the state to resolve. Lenin’s solution, as 
outlined in the 1903 program of the Russian Communist Party, was “the right of self-determination for 
all nations comprising the State”; that is, the strategic recognition and protection of individual 
nationalities’ interests within a multi-ethnic state structure. 
 
While Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were quick to rule out the possibility of territorial 
succession for China’s minorities, they followed the Soviet Union in creating a complex system of 
cultural, economic, and political autonomy to protect the independent development of each nationality 
free from ethnic chauvinism. In the PRC today, Leninist-style multiculturalism includes an intricate 
series of affirmative action policies aimed at preserving the cultures and identities of each of the 
state’s fifty-five officially recognized national minorities. 
 In this spirit, 42 of China’s 639 Olympic athletes in 2008 were non-Han competitors who managed to 
win 6 of China’s 100 medals. And while not all Chinese nationalities competed at Beijing, a colourful 
caricature of this ethnic mosaic was ceremonially paraded across the Bird’s Nest stadium at the start 
of the Opening Ceremony. Despite the tightly controlled nature of minority participation in the Games, 
the official policy of multiculturalism required a degree of visibility and active participation from the 
minorities, including thousands of torch bearers (including 22 Tibetan mountaineers on the slopes of 
Qomolangma), ethnic singing and dancing at Olympic events, and extensive media coverage of the 
9th National Minority Nationalities Traditional Sports Games held in Guangzhou in November 2007. 
Foreign visitors were also encouraged to visit the recently completed “Chinese Ethnic Culture Park,” a 
50-hectare “anthropological museum” located just south of the Olympic Green where visitors could 
experience real, live “ethnic gatherings,” and learn more about the “behaviour, genius, liability, 
aesthetics and cultural essence” of the minorities while wandering through the individual “ethnic 
villages” that have been authentically preserved by the Chinese state. 
Han racism 
While Leninist-style multiculturalism does create genuine spaces for minority agency, it also 
engenders resentment and racial hatred. As Frank Dikötter has demonstrated, racism has deep roots 
in China. Driven by a strand of cultural xenophobia that labelled non-sedentary neighbours 
“barbarians” and sought their exclusion from Chinese political life, Han racism was perhaps most 
clearly articulated in opposition to the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty, where Han revolutionaries 
like 18 year-old Zou Rong called for the “annihilation the five million and more of the furry and horned 
Manchu race, cleansing ourselves of 260 years of harsh and unremitting pain, so that the soil of the 
Chinese subcontinent is made immaculate, and the descendants of the Yellow Emperor will all become 
Washingtons.” 
Following the collapse of the Qing, this sort of racial vilification was swept under the rug of the new 
Republic and its idealized “Union of Five Races” (Han, Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, and Hui), and was 
later attacked as “Han chauvinism” by the CCP. But the party-state has struggled to completely stamp 
it out. If anything, the collapse of ideology and the rise of new communication technologies in China 
have provided alternative platforms for its articulation. 
 In its moderate form, Han racism identifies the Han people as the cultural and racial backbone of the 
nation, mandating the Han man’s burden of civilising the “backward” and “feudal” minorities. In its 
more virulent articulation, Han racism advocates the forced assimilation or extermination of all non-
Han peoples in China, an ideology that one online blogger termed “Chinazi” (China + Nazi = Chinazi) 
in admiration of Nazi-style racism while calling for the preservation of superior Han blood from 
barbarian contamination. 
 
This sort of chauvinism is largely hidden and subconscious. Take for example, the use of Han actors to 
portray the minority children at the opening ceremony. Facing criticism from the foreign media, 
BOCOG vice-president Wang Wei dismissed the incident as “not worth mentioning” and “completely 
normal” in Chinese tradition. But few Chinese would have missed the powerful symbolism of a red-
dressed Han girl singing the emotive “Ode to the Motherland” (gechangzuguo) from an elevated stage 
as the colourful “native” children paraded before her and the all-Han BOCOG officials before saluting 
the motherland’s flag. It would seem that the Han man’s burden was nearly fulfilled; but not all 
bloggers were happy. Several complained about the Han girl’s Western style dress and the Manchu 
derived “horse jacket” (magua) and “riding gown” (qipao) that other Han performers were wearing. 
These foreign styles, it was claimed, diluted the traditional essence of Chinese (zhonghua) culture 
embodied in the long silk robes of Han clothing (hanfu). 
Yet, outside the carefully controlled public arena, one finds more explicit expressions of Han racism. 
Following the March 14th riots in Lhasa, which killed 18 and injured over 500 mostly Han migrants, 
racist diatribes inundated popular Chinese blogs before being removed by censors. When discussing 
the vitriolic Song dynasty war song, “Defend the Han Homeland” (hanjia jiangtu) on Han Minzu BBS, a 
retired Beijing solider asserted that “national unity and fusion can only be achieved through struggle 
and not compromise,” and “because we Han give them preferential treatment, some national 
minorities now think they are naturally superior to the Han and discriminate against us, even to the 
extent of disrespecting our people’s history, customs, habits and traditional clothing.” Others used 
much less subtle language. 
Confucian ecumenism 
Throughout the long sweep of its history, racial exclusionism has been a distinct yet largely heterodox 
tradition. During times of strength and unity, the Chinese state stressed the ability of its culture to 
literally absorb neighbouring “barbarians” through a peaceful process of laihua (come and be 
transformed), incorporating them into the Confucian datong (great community) or tianxia (all under 
heaven). More recently, the colonial extension of the Chinese state has pushed its institutions and 
people into the furthest corners of the geobody, ensuring that few regions are not actively guarded 
over by Han soldiers, bureaucrats, teachers, or entrepreneurs. The demographic and political weight 
of the Han community has led some intellectuals to begin to question the official policy of 
multiculturalism, calling for a revival of what they see as an ethnically neutral Confucian ecumenism. 
Take for example, the US-educated Chair of Sociology at Peking University, Professor Ma Rong, who 
speaks with the authority of the Han state despite his Hui ethnicity. In a recent article, he called for 
the “de-politicization” of ethnic relations in China, which requires a departure from European-style 
liberalism and Soviet-style multiculturalism and a return to a traditional “culture-centred” approach to 
diversity that is fundamental to his reading of Confucianism. Rather than promoting ethnic integration, 
Ma Rong argues that the “institutionalization of ethnic groups” under Mao Zedong promoted ethnic 
stratification and tension. In response to Western criticism, China should “learn from their ancestors 
and their experience for thousands of years in guiding ethnic relations,” and return to the bedrock of 
Confucian “culturalism,” where culture rather than ethnicity serves as the key marker of civilisation 
and public policy focuses on promoting a universal culture and identity through acculturation rather 
than the protection of individual minority rights and benefits. 
 Confucianism and its idealized “harmonious society” were a dominant theme at the Opening 
Ceremony. Despite the brief nod to multiculturalism, it was Confucius in the form of 2008 Fou 
drummers who welcomed guests with the opening lines of the Analects. They were followed by 3000 
Confucian disciples and the repeated creation of the Chinese character for “peace” (he) as organizers 
sought to convey Chinese culture and its people as an ancient and outwardly looking civilisation. 
Riding a wave of renewed interest in Confucianism and the establishment of thousands of international 
institutes bearing his name, many Chinese hope that Confucius will one day rival Socrates’ influence 
on global thought. 
 
 Confucian ecumenism and its ethnic double blind were perhaps best symbolized by the Ceremony’s 
two leading (genuine) minority performers: the 15th century Hui Muslim admiral Zheng He and the 
Zhuang nationality gymnast Li Ning. While the Great Wall made only a fleeting appearance, the Silk 
Route and the “Maritime Silk Route” of Zheng He’s famous sea voyages took centre stage. As an 
armada of blue-robed performers swung massive wooden oars across the stadium floor, foreign 
television commentators waxed lyrical about the seven treasure fleets of this “Chinese Columbus,” 
who spread Chinese culture and goods as far as Africa and possibly beyond. The day started with the 
lighting of the Olympic torch next to a bust of Peking Man at Zhoukoudian and ended when the 
Olympic cauldron was set ablaze by Li Ning. Failing to mention his ethnicity, the People’s 
Dailydescribed him as a “Chinese gymnastic champion” and “national hero” who won 6 medals at the 
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games and then went onto become a millionaire entrepreneur in Reform 
era China. In representing both the traditional and modern faces of China, these two “Chinese” figures 
signified the great coalescing force of Confucianism and its ability to fuse different peoples into a 
powerful, cohesive whole. 
Final words: But whose? 
It’s too early in my research to draw any definitive conclusions. But I find it hard to imagine the CCP 
abandoning its official position on multiculturalism anytime soon. Like other multiethnic societies, 
outbursts of racist vitriol are inevitable in China, a troubling reflection of the growing social dislocation 
and atomization in this rapidly transforming society. The Internet provides new spaces (dark corners) 
for its expression; but the State and its intricate security apparatuses maintain a vigilante watch over 
any “irrational expressions of patriotism.” 
 In contrast, there appears to be great sympathy for a new approach to ethnic relations among the 
Han elite, and here Confucian ecumenism seems to offer a distinct alternative, or at the very least a 
new indigenous grammar. But shifting rhetoric is easy; transforming institutions is not. Dismantling 
the complex structures of Leninist-style multiculturalism would require bold action. Not only are the 
state’s basic institutions—government, education, media, police, and military—organized to reflect and 
respect the individual diversity of China’s 56 nationalities, but, perhaps more importantly, any attempt 
to unwind these institutions would meet with harsh criticism from the West and the withdrawal of the 
validation that China seems to crave. 
In seeking the moral high-ground on controversial issues such as Tibet and Xinjiang, China still feels 
compelled to argue its case in the language of the West: be it the Hegalian “politics of recognition” or 
the Nietzschean “war on terror.” Confucius might have welcomed the world to Beijing, but Count 
Jacques Rogge sent them home. 
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